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WHY IS THERE NO PHILOSOPHY 
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The philosophy of social science deals with ontological, epistemological and meth-
odological issues that are relevant to the disciplines of the social sciences. The ‘big six’ 
of social sciences usually encompasses economics, psychology, sociology, anthropol-
ogy, history and political science. Examining the individual disciplines, it can be noted 
that, with one exception, all of them systematically address the philosophical issues 
pertaining to their research field. Thus, there are philosophies of economics, psychol-
ogy, sociology, anthropology and history. However, there is no line of thought that 
could be named the ‘philosophy of political science.’ Why is that?
In the textbook on the philosophy of social science, in the section devoted to the 
philosophies of individual disciplines, Bruno Verbeek and Lee McIntyre (2017) in-
serted a chapter entitled Why Is There No Philosophy of Political Science? Although 
they argue that this does not mean that there are no studies on the philosophy of po-
litical science, they do not give any example of such a text. Honestly, I am not aware 
of a book, an article, or a conference speech, which contains the term ‘philosophy 
of political science’ in its title. Looking at the table of contents of several dozen rec-
ognized textbooks in the philosophy of social sciences written over the last twenty 
years, I have found only one (Kincaid, 2012) that even mentions political science in 
the part devoted to the sociology of knowledge. So why is there no philosophy of 
political science?
Verbeek and McIntyre indicate three reasons for this. According to them, the first 
reason is the relatively late emergence of political science as an academic discipline. 
Political science was founded around 1860 in the United States. Researchers identify-
ing with the new discipline deliberately refused to deal with the normative political 
theory they considered to be ‘literature,’ ‘philosophical speculation,’ ‘phenomenol-
ogy,’ or ‘hermeneutics,’ turning to positive political science instead. Subsequent gen-
erations of political scientists also denied the usefulness of the historical approach 
in favor of modeling their discipline after natural sciences. The emerging discipline 
was too busy implementing a positivist model of science to deal with a philosophical 
reflection on its theories, concepts and methods. Yet this reason does not seem very 
convincing, because other social disciplines witnessed similar processes, which never-
theless developed their own philosophies.
The second reason may be the fact that political science has always embraced many 
points of view, theories, methods, objects of research and intellectual traditions. Politi-
cal science consisted of various, often remote sub-disciplines, such as political theory, 
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political comparative studies, international relations, public law, public administra-
tion, and political economy. These divisions have additionally been emphasized by 
the competing scientific philosophies, social theories and methodologies that political 
scientists have referred to (positivism, behaviorism, rational choice theory, structur-
alism, poststructuralism, realism, institutionalism, pluralism, interactive symbolism, 
interpretivism and others). As a result, political science has never been a homogeneous 
and unified discipline. Again, it is difficult to consider this argument as convincing, 
because this kind of diversity has also characterized other social disciplines, which 
nevertheless created their own philosophies.
Finally, the third reason finds expression in the thesis that the lack of a philosophy 
of political science is a consequence of the lack of specific philosophical problems 
arising as a result of research carried out by political scientists. As a consequence, the 
philosophical problems encountered by political scientists do not differ from those that 
are relevant for other social disciplines. However, if the philosophy of political science 
does not exist because the philosophical issues it addresses can be reduced to those 
in other disciplines, the question seems to be: what is political science? For example, 
the application of the formal methods of economics in political science may mean that 
political science is the economics which examines politics (Verbeek, McIntyre, 2017: 
434–435).
Even if the philosophy of political science does not exist, should it exist? Many 
fundamental philosophical questions specific to the study of human political behavior 
can be indicated. It is difficult to deny that numerous philosophical analyses of this 
behavior are conducted within the framework of political theory. Yet the basic goal of 
political theory is not to consider the philosophical aspects of political science. We are 
not talking about the need for the philosophy of politics, but about the need for the phi-
losophy of political science, as is the case with the philosophy of history, philosophy of 
economics or philosophy of psychology as sub-disciplines of the philosophy of social 
science, which is a sub-discipline of the philosophy of science itself. The philosophy 
of political science, as a sub-discipline of the philosophy of social science, should help 
political science at least to face its ontological, epistemological and methodological 
problems.
PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS?
The absence of a philosophy of political science raises justified concerns about the 
philosophy of International Relations (IR) that are widely considered a sub-discipline 
of political science. If there is no philosophy of political science, is there an IR phi-
losophy? As concerns its form, this question is reminiscent of similar questions asked 
in the history of IR, as a discipline, by Martin Wight [why is there no international 
theory? (Wight, 1960)] or Justin Rosenberg [why is there no international historical 
sociology? (Rosenberg, 2006)].
Before answering this question, let us accompany Hayden White, briefly turning to 
the ‘philosophy of history.’ White emphasizes that the more history attempted to trans-
form itself into an objectivist, empiricist ‘science,’ “the more remote the knowledge 
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of the past which it produced became for generations confronting new social realities” 
(White, 2014: 58). When Karl Marx, Charles Darwin and Sigmund Freud demystified 
the world of the bourgeoisie, only ‘history’ remained as a resource of ‘facts and reali-
ties’ on which the idea of the present and the vision of the future could be founded. 
According to White, “[w]hence the flourishing of what professional historians would 
contemn as ‘philosophy of history,’ born of the effort to generalize and synthesize the 
particular truths turned up by professional historians in their plundering of the archives 
of old Europe” (Hayden, 2014: 58–59).
Looking for analogies between the emergence of history and IR, despite the tempo-
ral shift, it should be remembered that professional historiography was introduced to 
universities in the first half of the nineteenth century to serve the nation-state. The most 
important task of historiography was to create national identities and train teachers, 
politicians, administrators of empires and political ideologues. After the criticism of 
social Darwinism and of the myth of progress, historiography was assigned a position 
by the philosophy of positivism in the form of common sense empiricism that justifies 
neutrality and non-involvement. Usually, the ‘philosophy of history’ was rejected as 
being an ideology. Meanwhile, the philosophy of history (Comte, Hegel, Marx, Spen-
gler, Toynbee, Croce) was seen as a kind of extension or supplement, as White says, 
for what is called historical science or history proper. “Most philosophers of history 
– from Hegel on – regarded their work as an extension of or supplement to the work 
of ordinary historians. They saw themselves as providing procedures for summarising, 
synthesising or symbolising the myriads of works written by working historians in or-
der to derive some general principles regarding the nature of human beings’ existence 
with others in time” (White, 2019: 17).
One hundred years later, after World War Two, part of the American political elite 
feverishly sought knowledge and justification for their thinking and acting in the world. 
For many years, the ‘philosophy’ they needed was supplied by the theory of political 
realism. Its authors and supporters sought to cover the whole range of IR with its 
theory. In this context, Stefano Guzzini formulates an accurate assessment of the core 
of political realism, arguing that the evolution of realistic thinking can be understood 
as repeatedly undertaken, unsuccessful attempts to translate the maxims of nineteenth-
century European diplomatic practice into the more general laws of American social 
science and the goals of the foreign policy of the new superpower (Guzzini, 1998: 1). 
This led to an ambivalence between ‘scientific’ IR and the historicist approach in the 
process of formatting the discipline in American universities. Consequently, the dis-
pute over the philosophy of IR resulted in two approaches. One argued that history 
should be recognized as the foundation for understanding international relations; the 
other denied history any significant importance in analyzing and interpreting interna-
tional relations. However, more important than this division is the fact that the promo-
tion and expansion of political realism, understood as the perspective of thinking about 
international relations, seemed to erase all the alternatives. To put it short, political 
realism has been assigned the role of both the theory and philosophy of IR. From this 
perspective, the dispute over the role of history was of secondary importance. There-
fore, if we ask about the philosophy of IR, it was this special dual role assigned to 
political realism that partly determined its absence.
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Let us begin by explaining why, despite the significant intellectual and institutional 
development of IR after World War Two, it did not generate any ‘grand ideas’ that 
would influence the broadly understood humanities. Barry Buzan and Richard Little 
metaphorically identify this problem by talking about the semi-permeable membrane 
insulating IR from other disciplines, which lets in ideas from outside only and blocks 
their movement in the opposite direction. It is therefore difficult to answer the ques-
tion of what other disciplines have learned from IR. Among the few exceptions worth 
mentioning is Michael Mann, who argued that historical sociologists have ‘invaded’ 
political realism and returned with valuable ‘spoils.’ The significance of this expedi-
tion is diminished by the fact that, independently of international relations researchers, 
they concluded that wars make states and states make wars (Charles Tilly). Histo-
rian Paul Schroeder tried to remove the differences, mainly those in understanding the 
role of theory and methodology, between history and IR. John L. Gaddis and Jack S. 
Levy indicated the potential synergy between international history and IR. However, 
these cases can only illustrate that the theory of international relations does not exceed 
disciplinary boundaries. Also the ‘big names’ of this discipline – Hedley Bull, Hans 
J. Morgenthau, Robert Gilpin, Stephen Krasner, Robert Keohane, James Rosenau and 
Kenneth Waltz – are virtually unknown outside of IR. This lack of exchange seems to 
contradict IR understanding itself as a discipline that by its name indicates that it deals 
with an inter- subject matter.
Buzan and Little see the reasons for this situation in IR defining its subject matter 
in a surprisingly narrow and traditional way – as relations, mainly between states. It 
essentially places its object of research within political science, limiting the scope of 
IR to the sub-discipline of ‘international’ politics, with the ‘political’ element at its 
center. Two symbolic works of American political realism, Politics Among Nations 
(1948) by Hans Morgenthau, and Theory of International Politics (1979) by Kenneth 
Waltz explicitly chose this option, assuming that removing from sight everything but 
international politics is a necessary condition for an effective theory of internationality 
to be constructed. Social Theory of International Politics (1999) by Alexander Wendt 
continues the same tradition (Buzan, Little, 2001: 30). Buzan and Little seek to remedy 
this conditionwith the concept of the ‘international system’ understood not only as re-
lations between states, but as a network of interactions binding people in the political, 
economic, social and ecological aspects. They see the potential of such an approach 
to transform IR into a kind of ‘meta-discipline’ that can systematically combine the 
macro-perspectives of social science and history. The comparative advantage of the 
discipline is seen in its potential for constructing a holistic theoretical model capable of 
appealing to political scientists, economists, lawyers, sociologists, anthropologists and 
historians (Buzan, Little, 2001: 20–21). However, the attempt to fulfill this promise 
with International Systems in World History (2000), with all due respect, can hardly be 
considered as a game changer.
Justin Rosenberg also tries to indicate and explain these reasons, arguing that 
at a deep level IR has never been established as an area ‘in its own right.’ The fun-
damental thesis by Rosenberg is that IR has never realized the potential of its sub-
ject matter: the international dimension of the social world (Rosenberg, 2017: 90). 
Developed as an extension of political science, IR has remained imprisoned in the 
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ontology borrowed from political science, something Rosenberg dubs ‘the prison of 
Political Science.’
According to Rosenberg, the emergence of IR as an extension of political science 
is the primary cause of IR being unable to produce ideas that would be inspirational 
to other disciplines. Answering the question of what this ‘prison of Political Science’ 
is, Rosenberg draws arguments from one of the fundamental texts of IR, namely The 
Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939 by Edward H. Carr [1946, (1939)].
Carr uses a simple diagram of the development of scientific disciplines to indicate 
that if a discipline is at the initial stage of its development, normative goals dominate 
over the analysis of facts. Researchers pay less attention to facts and causal analyses 
and focus on developing visionary projects instead. When the implementation of these 
projects fails, the researchers reach for analyses and studies which close the initial (uto-
pian) period of the development of each discipline. Thus, the teleological aspect domi-
nated in the emerging ‘theory of international politics.’ After 1931, when the course 
of events in international relations showed that ‘pure aspirations’ were inadequate as 
a foundation for the theory of international politics, serious, critical and analytical 
thinking about international problems became possible. Carr names the period in the 
development of the discipline that follows its utopian stage – ‘realism.’ When used in 
the analysis of international practice, realism emphasizes the importance of operating 
forces and the inevitability of existing tendencies, indicating that the highest wisdom 
lies in the acceptance of and adaptation to these forces and tendencies. Mature think-
ing combines goals with observation and analysis. Utopia and reality are therefore 
two faces of political science. A realist defined in this manner treats political theory as 
a kind of codification of political practice, but does not a priori reject the transforma-
tive role that political theory can play in the political process. Realistic political sci-
ence must be based on the recognition of the interdependence of theory and practice 
that can only be achieved by combining utopia and reality (Carr, 1946, (1939): 4–12).
Carr attempts to redesign the ‘theory of international politics’ by indicating its first 
principles. The beginning of chapter 7, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, seems to be a promis-
ing attempt: “Man has always lived in groups.” Carr appears to notice this universal 
feature of the human world, which should provide the theoretical and empirical start-
ing point for the discipline called IR: the coexistence of multiple social groups. There-
fore, we expect that IR will make this feature the foundation of its separate object of 
research and will recognize the special significance of this internationality for general 
social existence.
Unfortunately, as Rosenberg notes, we quickly discover that Carr does not see this. 
He does not address the question of the coexistence of multiple societies in any way. 
What he does see is expressed in his fundamental statement on politics. Since man has 
always lived in groups, one of the functions of each group was to regulate the relations 
between its members. Referring to Aristotle’s thesis about man as a political animal by 
nature, Carr indicates the subject matter of political science: it deals with the behavior 
of people in organized groups [Carr, 1946, (1939): 95; see Rosenberg, 2016b: 4]. In-
dividual behavior is characterized by both the tendency for individual egoism and the 
ability to cooperate. Similarly, the political society embodied by the state contains this 
duality that is expressed by the need for both coercion and legitimization. This dualism 
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determines the nature of politics. Ultimately, what is true in relation to internal politics 
must be equally true in relation to international politics. ‘The infancy of the science of 
international politics’ consists of the fact that this science has not yet realized this basic 
fact about its subject matter. As a result, Carr legitimately titles this chapter of his book 
The Nature of Politics, and his reasoning cannot be accused of being irrational.
Nevertheless, as Rosenberg points out, there is something special about Carr’s 
considerations. In the opening sentence of The Twenty Years’ Crisis, speaking about 
politics, Carr does not talk about the infancy of political science, but about the infancy 
of the science of international politics. One of the most important goals of his delibera-
tions is to formulate deeper premises on the basis of which this new science could be 
developed. However, despite this declaration, Carr focuses on the analysis of relations 
within social groups rather than relations between them. Although he further analyzes 
the role of power, economics, morality and propaganda within and without, he in fact 
applies everything he knows about the nature of politics per se to his understanding of 
international politics.
Thus, Carr only apparently sets the foundations for IR while, in fact, he does not 
so much identify the premises specific to international politics, but rather extends the 
premises of politics formulated by political science to international relations. This is 
a philosophy (ontology) of political power (even more crucial in the sphere without 
a central government) rather than the ontology of internationality as such. Rosenberg 
stresses that this approach prevails in IR and it is difficult to find a proposal to define 
this discipline in a different way in the canon of international relations (Rosenberg, 
2016b: 4–5). Even if such attempts appear, they are often assessed as explaining noth-
ing. It is therefore less surprising that, also in the institutional dimension, the units of 
academia that study International Relations are part of Political Science.
Meanwhile, disciplines such as geography, history or sociology have their respec-
tive ‘hard cores’ (ontologies), features of social reality that emerge from specific in-
dications and constitute the essence of their object of research and, at the same time, 
decide about their separateness. Generally speaking, spatiality is such a foundation 
for geography, temporality – for history, and society – for sociology. Each discipline 
‘owns’ something that establishes and constitutes the most general dimension of the 
social world. To a large extent, thanks to this their studies produce concepts and theo-
ries that can move around and be used in other humanities. And this is actually happen-
ing all the time (Rosenberg, 2016b: 6).
Carr’s conceptualization was not an exception in this respect. The study of the na-
ture of politics has been of permanent interest to researchers in international relations. 
Beginning the theorization of international relations with considerations on the nature 
of politics was to provide the foundation knowledge for understanding international-
ity. Hans J. Morgenthau in Politics among Nations (1948) declares that international 
politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. In the 1959 article titled Theoretical 
Aspects of International Relations, Morgenthau reiterates his earlier theses; (1) that 
the theoretical goals of international relations are the same as those of international 
politics; (2) that the theory of international politics is only a special type of the general 
theory of politics; and, finally, (3) that the general theory of politics is the same as po-
litical science (Morgenthau, 1959: 15). Bernard de Jouvenel (1955) begins his work on 
 Why is there no Philosophy of International Relations 25
sovereignty with reflections on the essence of politics. Martin Wight, in his landmark 
article titled Why Is There No International Theory? (1960), deals with the essence 
of political theory and explains why there is no international theory and why only the 
history of diplomacy can deal with internationality. Although this kind of reflection 
and the related debates have almost completely disappeared from our research field, 
the tradition forged in this way still makes us take it for granted that the co-formation 
of internality and internationality is the best way of identifying the ontology of inter-
national relations.
As a result, none of the theories of international relations, nor political realism, nor 
its alternatives in the form of liberalism, constructivism, Marxism, feminism, post-
modernism, poststructuralism or postcolonial theory set out the unique properties of 
internationality as their foundation. None of these theories formulate a fundamental 
claim toIR’s own subject matter in the way geography, history or sociology do. This 
leads to the conviction that international relations do not have to be formed by those 
aspects of the social world that are specific to them, and can be interpreted in terms of 
ideas imported from disciplines that examine the aspects specific to them respectively. 
The basic disadvantage of this openness of IR to other disciplines is the lack of con-
sideration on its own ‘deep ontology.’ This seems to be the main reason for the lack of 
the philosophy of IR.
As a result, in the absence of such philosophical and metatheoretical reflection, no 
grand idea travels from IR to other disciplines. Researchers of international relations 
have not formulated any ideas about the unique importance of internationality for the 
human world, following the model of grand ideas brought from geography, history or 
sociology. It is this state of affairs that Rosenberg describes with the metaphor of IR 
being in ‘the prison of Political Science.’ There are three main reasons why IR is in 
this prison. Firstly, because IR is unable to reject being perceived as a sub-division of 
political science. The subordinate identity of IR can be changed only when we create 
a broader and deeper definition of internationality, or rather propose a philosophy of 
internationality that will embrace its political dimension without being limited to this 
dimension only. Secondly, the lack of the philosophy of internationality embeds IR 
within another discipline, preventing it from developing freely and fulfilling its own 
potential as a particular perspective on the social world. Finally, like in a real prison, 
IR has visitors, but cannot reciprocate their visits. IR adopts ideas formulated by other 
disciplines, but cannot return the favor with its own ideas. Regardless of the signifi-
cance of internationality for other social sciences, an imprisoned IR is invisible to 
them (Rosenberg, 2016b: 8).
This ongoing embedding of IR in political science is illustrated by its status in the 
United States. Between 1890 and 1910, American academia developed a system of 
separate disciplines that were institutionalized on a national scale in the form of sepa-
rate departments (faculties) established at universities and conducting research and 
teaching in each discipline (Abbot, 2001: 122–123). When such a disciplinary map of 
social sciences emerged, IR as a course was placed within the framework of political 
science and has remained there ever since. The vast majority of American international 
relations researchers have obtained doctoral degrees in political science and remain 
employed within faculties of political science. IR is one of the many sub-disciplines 
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that make up political science, and international relations researchers typically account 
for around twenty percent of their faculties’ members (Oren, 2016: 21). By this token, 
all organizational issues, but also the reputation of IR, depend on the evaluation of col-
leagues representing other research fields within political science, usually including, 
in the case of American academia, the evaluation by researchers into US politics. They 
usually are the largest or dominant group in the faculties of political science. They 
also exert the greatest influence on the policies of leading political science journals. 
Whereas they do not decide what research problems are considered to be the most 
important within IR, they have a significant impact on how these problems should 
be investigated. Research standards prevailing in American political science usually 
consist of ‘testing hypotheses’ with quantitative methods. As a result, it is very diffi-
cult to achieve academic success in American political science by conducting research 
that deviates from the neo-positivist orthodoxy. Even in the times when the ‘theoreti-
cal oligarchs’ (for example, Kenneth Waltz or Robert Keohane) exercised the greatest 
influence on IR, postulating that research should be based on grand theoretical ideas, 
their students were pressured by political scientists, who expected that research would 
be conducted in accordance with the standard of testing hypotheses (Oren, 2016: 22). 
This pattern has become popular, and dominates in the vast majority of countries, in-
cluding universities in Poland.
INTERNALISM, EXTERNALISM AND CORRELATIONISM  
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
I accomplish two basic goals in this text. Firstly, I challenge the legitimacy of atti-
tudes dominating in IR, which I call internalism, externalism and correlationism, 
and – referring to Rosenberg’s proposal – I present a concept of ontology on which the 
philosophy of IR can be based. Secondly, I present the nature and consequences of the 
negative character of IR, which involves the absence of the philosophy of the disci-
pline and studies of internationality following the model applied by political science. 
Understanding this ‘strange orthodoxy’ may open the way to overcome it, thereby fa-
cilitating the possibility of conceiving an ontology of IR, or outlining a path that could 
lead to the philosophy of International Relations.
Internalism in International Relations
One of the complicated problems in social science is usually referred to as ‘internal-
ism,’ ‘unilinearity’ or ‘methodological nationalism.’ The core of internalism seems to 
lie at the root of sociology and involves the conceptualization of society in its singular-
ity. The result is an inability to theorize the importance of social multiplicity for the 
social world. From the point of view of IR, in short, internalism is an approach that 
explains internationality through internality. Internalists assume that the key to under-
standing international relations is provided by what is within society. Internationalism 
has founded sociology as a ‘science of society’ on the assumption that the changes and 
 Why is there no Philosophy of International Relations 27
development of any society can and should be explained through its internal constitu-
tion. As a result, sociologists approached interactions between societies as insignifi-
cant, and their effects as negligible, in the pursuit of understanding society (Tenbruck, 
1994: 75). However, society should not be treated like a set starting point, but rather 
like a puzzle that sociologists should try to solve. An internalist attempt to understand 
international relations may be somewhat useful, but ultimately leads to theorizing the 
subject matter of IR in the form of an unrealistic model that removes everything that 
results from the ‘eternal’ fact of a multitude of societies. This type of theorizing domi-
nates in the classical social theory.
The early-modern way of resolving relations between the most important entities, 
and expressed in the principle of the sovereignty and exclusivity of the state, led to 
a fundamental distinction between the locus of ‘real’ internal politics and barely any 
space for relations between states, a space whose location nobody actually knows. The 
secondary character of these relations is most fully reflected in the etymology of the 
word outside (external, not included in, from the center to the edges). People rooted 
in this internalist way of thinking believe that the need to distinguish between what is 
inside and outside can justifiably and simply be ignored by reducing all social action 
to a robust joint foundation: power struggles, instrumental rationality, and universal 
ethics, none of which can ever be universal. However, a deeper reflection allows one to 
see that it is difficult to simply transfer the assumptions adopted in relation to the com-
munity in the form of the state, and – in fact – to any form of political community, to 
an international reality in which such a community does not exist on principle. That is 
why those who try to understand internationality in internalist terms are always being 
warned against the danger of the ‘domestic analogy.’ Due to the model of ‘domestic 
analogy,’ IR cannot indicate its subject matter, its ‘grand idea.’ I believe that this anal-
ogy is also responsible for the inability of IR to create its own philosophy. The absence 
of this philosophy facilitates the criticism of all cosmopolitan ideas which – when 
confronted with the strict assumptions adopted in relation to the state – are easily dis-
credited as utopian or idealistic.
Externalism in International Relations
Externalism is founded on the assumption that what is external is crucial to under-
standing the essence of international relations. In the long run, the impact of interna-
tionality can be seen in the fact that societies are born and die. Their death is often the 
result of various internal circumstances and conflicts. However, it may also be caused 
by external factors that lead to a loss of independence and complete absorption by an-
other society. New societies can also emerge in many ways, by dividing or combining 
different people and groups. One can hardly defy the statement that “social develop-
ment has never been the result of internal history” (Tenbruck, 1994: 87).
The advantage of these disputes is the understanding that numerous analyses are based 
on an unjustified conviction that this duality can be solved by accepting the assumption 
that monism constitutes one half of a duality. This solution cannot be considered appro-
priate because neither political theory (internally) nor theories of international politics 
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(externally) have been capable of such sophistication, at least for now. As a result, both 
modern political theory and theories of international politics reproduce this duality. They 
encourage us to choose one side of this division: a sovereign state or a system of sover-
eign states. By doing so, we enter “an ultimately irresolvable antagonism between the 
claims of state and the claims of the system of states” (Walker, 2009: 59).
Externalism in IR is well illustrated by Kenneth Waltz’s theorizing. Waltz’s concept 
of structural realism as a theory of international politics focuses entirely on external-
ity. States as international actors are theorized as functionally undifferentiated, and their 
most important behaviors result from the demands made of them by the international 
system organized according to the anarchy principle. Their internal diversity is not part 
of the international system, and their international behavior at the system level is inde-
pendent of ‘their interior.’ In this way, Waltz proposes an economical theory that ‘does 
not mix’ internal (unit) level factors with external (systemic) level factors. Analyzing 
international relations as a system, one cannot justify its functioning by referring to data 
at the unit level. This does not meet the requirements of systemic analysis. Waltz asks: 
if changes in the results of international activities are directly related to internal changes 
within the actors of international relations, how can one explain the similarity of these 
results over time, or their recurrence, if the actors change? He answers that this ap-
proach is erroneous because the striking similarity of these relations through millennia 
is the outcome of the enduring anarchic nature of international relations (Waltz, 1979: 
65). Waltz is certainly right in saying that international relations cannot be explained 
exclusively in internalist terms, by referring to the analysis of unit-level factors. How-
ever, similar doubts are aroused by his thesis about this analysis concentrating solely 
on factors at the international level, thus taking the externalist angle; even though he is 
convinced of the interaction of factors on both levels. Despite emphasizing the need to 
distinguish between internal and external phenomena, Waltz has never proposed a doc-
trine of the actual separation of the two levels. For Waltz, internal processes are both 
a source of changes in the system and of possible changes to the system itself (Waltz, 
1998: 380). Additionally, although Waltz advises international relations researchers to 
focus on separate theories of internal and international politics, this should be continued 
until someone manages to integrate both levels into one theory (Waltz, 1986: 340). The 
ultimate criterion for his choice is not provided by ontology, but by epistemology: the 
explanatory power of both approaches. Waltz points to the externalist level of analysis 
as providing greater explanatory power. He is convinced that his systemic theory does 
not explain everything, but it makes it possible to identify the most important factors for 
international relations, as opposed to the internal level, which presents an infinite number 
of variables that can affect the behavior of individual actors.
Correlationism in International Relations
Correlationism is a label I give to the attitude where the correlation between what is 
internal and what is external is a key to understanding the essence of international 
relations. The concept of correlationism applied as a tool to understand this specific 
situation of IR directs us towards interpreting the essence (or the ‘hard core’) of IR as 
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correlate of what is internal and what is external. In this sense, Waltz’s recommenda-
tion for international relations researchers to focus on separate theories of internal and 
international politics until someone manages to integrate both levels into one theory 
should be recognized as a correlationist postulate.
The concept of correlationism is borrowed from the contemporary French philoso-
pher Quentin Meillassoux [2016, (2006); Harman, 2011; Bryant et al., 2011]. A brief 
introduction to the essence of correlationism is therefore necessary. For many years, 
continental philosophy has focused on discourse, culture, consciousness, power, or 
ideas as constituents of reality. Humans have been the main focus of these works, 
though reality has been treated only as a correlate of human thinking. Thus, phenom-
enology, structuralism, poststructuralism, deconstructionism and postmodernism are 
obvious examples of the anti-realist current in continental philosophy (Bryant, Sr-
nicek, Harman, 2011: 2–3). This current has been manifested in many different ways. 
It has focused on problems such as death and finitude; aversion to science; concentra-
tion on language, culture and subjectivity with prejudice to material factors; the an-
thropocentric attitude towards nature; rejecting the search for absolutes, and indicating 
the specific conditions of our historical ‘thrownness’ (Heideggerian Geworfenheit). 
This current has encompassed also the ‘cultural pivot’ of Marxism, which has led to 
a growing interest in textual and ideological criticism at the expense of the analysis of 
economic reality (Bryant, Srnicek, Harman, 2011: 4).
I find the current approach to international relations, which continues to be pos-
tulated by IR, to be analogous to the approach of a philosophical correlationist. IR 
has enduringly postulated and attempted to correlate what is internal with what is 
external. Correlationists distinguish between internationality (which they understand 
as the cyclical nature of ‘recurrence and repetition’ and the absence of an international 
theory [Wight, 1966, (1960): 3], a thesis which is cognitively and normatively insig-
nificant), and what is internal and is expressed as sovereignty, law and progress. Yet 
the overarching goal of every correlationist is to create an idealization in which this 
division into internal/external will be abolished. This division is sometimes regarded 
as universal and timeless, and sometimes – as a particular and modern ‘truth.’ On other 
occasions it is rejected as reductionist because it characterizes internationality as an 
antisocial reality which is guided by anarchy, thus ignoring and obscuring the densely 
structured network of relations which go beyond what is internal. Sometimes, it is 
considered ideological because, due to its inadequacies and concealments, it is biased 
and created for somebody, thus becoming part of “the illusion of the epoch” (Selby, 
2007: 337–338).
The separation of what is internal from what is external, and the dream of com-
bining the two, has actually led to various forms of correlationism between the two 
spheres of politics. This desire has linked political science and IR like Siamese twins, 
who seem to wait eternally for the intervention of the surgeon. This division, and the 
dream of overcoming it have become so ‘natural’ for researchers that they have forgot-
ten about its genesis, in spite of the effects it has exerted on studies of the dynamics 
of power and politics. Robert B. J. Walker has no doubt that theories of international 
relations express the limitations contained in modern political thinking. These theories 
can be understood as a product of specific historical conditions, which, moreover, no 
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longer exist. They can also be understood as an ideological expression of the interests 
of some societies. They can finally be understood in terms of their attitude to the in-
stitutionalization of individual academic disciplines; in particular, to the controversy 
within political science, the discipline that has had the greatest impact on the devel-
opment of IR as a way of thinking and research (Walker, 1993: 16). If theories of 
international relations express the historical context of the political community that 
crystallized in early modern Europe, doubts may arise about their legitimacy as the 
basis for thinking about another political community. The collapse of universalist po-
litical, religious and metaphysical hierarchies was a problem that Nicolò Machiavelli, 
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke tried to resolve. These seem to be the most important 
reasons for the importance of their texts for contemporary thinking about international 
relations, rather than for eternal truths about realpolitik or international anarchy. Estab-
lishing this kind of correlation by finding the foundations for thinking about interna-
tional relations in these texts must inevitably lead one astray. The historical specificity 
of this correlation is systematically obscured by philosophically trivial but discursively 
effective theses of, for example, inherited intellectual traditions, the relation between 
truth and power, essentialist theories of state, or the theses of unchanging human na-
ture (Walker, 1993: 17). This clearly shows the difficulty of abandoning correlation-
ism and the resulting limitations in establishing the ontology of international relations 
outside political theory and political science. Thinking about international relations is 
particularly interesting in this context because of the difficulties experienced by this 
discipline in establishing its subject matter. The abandonment of correlationism must 
involve overcoming and rejecting the intellectual and political horizons inherited and 
accepted so far. This is necessary because IR, like no other discipline, is explicitly 
related to political boundaries. Theories of international relations want to “explain 
and offer advice about the security and transgression of borders between established 
forms of order of community inside and the realm of either danger (insecurity, war) or 
a more universalistically conceived humanity (peace, global politics) outside” [italics 
– A.G.] (Walker, 1993: 18). In order to go beyond the correlational understanding of 
the ontology of IR, theories should not be borrowed on the basis of which models and 
metaphors are constructed and methodologies are legitimized. One should rather seek 
to understand how the theories of international relations and their ontologies have been 
constituted on the basis of historical specificity.
In the 1960s, a discussion between the supporters of the ‘scientific’ and ‘tradition-
alist’ approaches in IR was held. Hedley Bull and Morton Kaplan embodied the two 
sides in this discussion. Bull argued that the scientific method of studying interna-
tional relations was inadequate because of the nature of these relations. He was par-
ticularly concerned about the process of transferring the philosophical and theoretical 
assumptions formulated with regard to the political community within the state, to the 
analysis of relations between states (the ‘domestic analogy’). However, Bull’s inter-
est in whether international relations differ from the internal politics of states and the 
essence of this differentness has not become the subject of in-depth reflection, and 
has quickly evolved into an epistemological question of how research should be con-
ducted. Although the debate began with the issue of ontological duality, it eventually 
and quickly turned into a claim for epistemological monism. Although Bull supported 
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the traditional view that relations between states are sufficiently different to justify the 
existence of a separate discipline and different research strategies, the ‘socio-scientific’ 
approach accepted their fundamental continuity. Thus, nothing stood in the way of 
building empirically testable models, transferring assumptions, metaphors, research 
strategies, and the assumption of rational action, from one context to another. This is 
another reason for the absence of an ontology and philosophy of IR.
Hedley Bull’s attitude may illustrate a form of strong correlationism, which never-
theless does not solve the problem of the subject matter and the absence of the philoso-
phy of IR. This strong correlationism interprets relations between states as ‘something 
more’ than just anarchy. In this approach, the international system can be understood 
as a form of political life that makes it possible for cooperation to exist (Bull, Watson, 
1984). Robert B. J. Walker makes an attempt to show the way out of this deadlock, or 
rather looks for the traces of this ‘traditional’ perspective. He finds them in the con-
cept of ‘interdependence,’ in the analysis of international regimes and in emphasizing 
the reformist potential of international organizations. However, Walker says that few 
researchers argue that we have to move from a world of state communities to a world 
of global community. Ultimately, Walker merely observes that in IR, the epistemologi-
cal demand for a universally applicable scientific method coexists with the opposite 
approach, expressed in various ways in ontological, ethical and ideological forms, 
claiming that human life is fragmented (Walker, 1993: 85). However, he does not focus 
his attention on the essence of this fragmentation, although he is aware that the differ-
ences between the perspectives of international relations studies have their ontological 
causes, and he limits himself to criticizing universal epistemological demands.
Robert Keohane takes a typical correlationalist position and sees the weaknesses 
of both the rationalistic and the reflective approaches in the very absence of the cor-
relation between what is internal and external. In his opinion, neither approach takes 
a sufficient account of internal politics. Internal politics is ignored by most strategic 
analyses based on the game theory and on the analysis of changes in international re-
gimes. Similarly, a reflective approach dealing with the problem of sovereignty clearly 
separates internal and international politics. Keohane argues that when reflectionists 
criticize the reification of the state by neorealistic theory, they should present how this 
reification occurred historically and how it is reproduced within the internal/external 
dichotomy. Such an analysis could produce a fruitful examination of changes in the 
preferences that result from complex interactions between the activities of interna-
tional institutions and processes of internal politics (Keohane, 1988: 392).
All this illustrates our enduring tendency to solve problems arising from the in-
ternal/external duality through an appeal to temporality, the processes of an eman-
cipatory history, and to a narrative focused on time. Robert B. J. Walker talks about 
it using the metaphor of the temptation to drive the great bus of linear history down 
a dead-end street. Such an approach cannot provide a solution to the problem of the 
form of political life, which has been organized as a relationship between particular-
ity (state) and universality (international system). As a result, although the bus of 
linear history seems to offer a cheap ride, it can only travel around a short circuit. 
Hence the endless ride from ‘political realism’ to ‘political idealism’ and back again 
in IR (Walker, 2009: 59).
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SPECULATIVE MATERIALISM
For several years, there have been approaches in philosophy rejecting the traditional 
focus on textual criticism or the structure of consciousness. Ontological issues become 
essential instead. All new approaches speculate on the nature of reality in different 
ways. Their goal is to transcend the critical and linguistic turn towards realism and ma-
terialism. This change has been pioneered by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, whose 
works from the 1970s and 1980s present an ontological vision of a subjective reality 
whose subject and thought are the final and residual product. Slavoj Žižek, Alain Ba-
diou and Bruno Latour are also mentioned as forerunners of the change.
In the course of this shift, the origins of the philosophical movement called specu-
lative realism1 can be traced back, with a precision which is rare in such cases, to an 
academic meeting which took place at the Goldsmiths College of London Univer-
sity in April 2007. The meeting was attended by, among others, Ray Brassier, Iain 
H. Grant, Graham Harman and Quentin Meillassoux. Speculative realism, founded on 
the works and discussions of these authors, has inspired many different philosophical 
positions and disciplines, ranging from anthropology through archeology, architec-
ture, feminism, medieval studies and musicology to research into science. This inspi-
ration consisted above all of the rejection of what Quentin Meillassoux was the first 
one to call ‘correlationism.’ While philosophical realists assume the existence of the 
world independently of human thought (reality exists outside our mind), philosophical 
idealists deny the existence of such an autonomous world (reality exists only in our 
mind). The essence of correlationism is to take an intermediate position between real-
ism and idealism. According to correlationists, humans and the world are inevitably 
correlated, in the sense that the only thing which we have access to are the correlates 
of thought and the world. Humans cannot know the world without it being mediated by 
the mind. As a result, correlationists consider the dispute between realism and idealism 
as a ‘pseudo-problem.’ Correlationists maintain that we can think neither of a human 
without the world nor of a world without the human (Harman, 2011: 2). Meillassoux 
labels the contemporary opponent of every form of realism a ‘correlationalist.’ Cor-
relationism takes many forms, in transcendental philosophy, phenomenology and post-
modernism. Despite the profound internal diversity of these currents, all of them share 
the conviction that there are no objects, no events, no laws or beings which are not 
always correlated with a certain point of view, with a subjective access.
Anyone maintaining the contrary, that is claiming that it is possible to access reality 
in itself, existing independently of his viewpoint, or his category, or his culture, or his 
language, and so on, is a realist (Meillassoux, 2014: 9). The aim of Meillassoux’s phi-
losophy is to rebut any form of correlativity by demonstrating that thinking in a way 
which meets specific conditions provides access to reality in itself. In other words, he 
maintains that an absolute, that is, a reality that is absolutely separate from the subject, 
can be conceived by this subject. To be precise, Meillassoux understands correlation-
1 The term ‘speculative realism’ should be treated as a kind of an ‘umbrella’ encompassing vari- 
ous philosophical approaches sharing an attitude towards the common enemy that is correlationism. 
Quentin Meillassoux defines his philosophy as ‘speculative materialism’ in order to distance himself 
from other ‘speculative realists.’
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ism not so much as an anti-realism but as an anti-absolutism. It is a modern way of 
rejecting all possible knowledge of an absolute. It is the claim that we are locked up 
in our representations – conscious, linguistic, historical ones – without any means to 
access a timeless reality independent of our point of view (Meillassoux, 2014: 20). 
Correlationism was the dominant ontological position in continental philosophy in the 
twentieth century. Although its roots can be traced back to the critical philosophy of 
Immanuel Kant from the late eighteenth century, it still remains the dominant philo-
sophical perspective.
Nowadays, this correlationalist attitude typically argues that if one tries to think 
about something outside of thought, it leads to a contradiction, because this ‘some-
thing’ must enter one’s thinking first. Meillassoux recognizes this argument and treats 
it as indisputable. He assumes that a correlatiional circle made of humans and the world 
is not a trivial mistake or wordplay, but a starting point for any rigorous philosophy. He 
believes that a position that can be described as ‘strong correlationism’ is possible and 
different from absolute idealism. This radicalization in the form of strong correlation-
ism leads to a new position Mellassoux describes as speculative materialism.
While the traditional philosophical debate focused on the question of who has the 
best model of substance, since Kant it has transformed into a dispute over who has 
identified the true nature of the human-world correlate. “[E]ver since Kant, to discover 
what divides rival philosophers is no longer to ask who has grasped the true nature of 
substantiality, but rather to ask who has grasped the more originary correlation: is it the 
thinker of the subject-object correlation, the noetico-noematic correlation, or the lan-
guage-referent correlation? The question is no longer ‘which is the proper substrate?’ 
but ‘which is the proper correlate?’” (Meillassoux, 2008: 5–6). Opposing Kant, Meil-
lassoux calls the dominance of this correlational circle not a ‘Copernican Revolution,’ 
but ‘the Kantian catastrophe.’ The Kantian position that reality ‘revolves’ around the 
conditions of our thinking is essentially similar to a ‘Ptolemaic Counter-Revolution.’ 
In this particular historic moment, when science made a leap forward and seemed to 
seize an absolute, Kant enslaved philosophy by bringing it to a model of finitude that 
still dominates philosophy today (Harman, 2011: 10). However, despite this criticism 
of Kant, we cannot go back to being metaphysicians or dogmatists. On this point, we 
must be the heirs of Kant. Meillassoux argues that we must, therefore, remember about 
the apparently unanswerable force of the correlational circle. Naïve realism is certainly 
not a satisfactory solution to this problem.
All these concepts are pillars of both common sense and natural sciences. However, 
they are in a dramatic contrast to the correlational position. Defenders of correlativism 
can easily ridicule common sense, but they must seriously treat their answer to the 
natural sciences. What Meillassoux seeks is a non-dogmatic version of an absolute 
growing internally from the ashes of the correlational circle. Therefore, any material-
ism that wants to be speculative, and for which absolute reality is a thoughtless entity, 
must assume that thought is not necessary (something can be independent of thought) 
and that thought can think of what must be when there is no thought. In order to avoid 
Kantian agnosticism (the impossibility of knowing things-in-themselves) and reality 
‘collapsing’ into thought, Meillassoux proposes a metaphysics of absolute contingen-
cy, where anything can happen without a reason and without warning. Everything can 
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collapse, from trees to stars, from stars to laws, from the laws of physics to the laws of 
logic. This may happen because of the absence of any higher law capable of preserving 
anything from destruction.
THE IDEA OF PLURALITY AS AN ONTOLOGY OF THE PHILOSOPHY  
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Consider what can constitute such a non-dogmatic version of an absolute growing in-
ternally from the ashes of the correlational circle in IR. Consider what special feature 
of the social world can constitute the ‘hard core’ of IR. What will it allow IR to say, 
in its own language, about its particular subject matter to other disciplines? If we ask 
this question of the canon works on international relations, the answer must be: we do 
not know.
Justin Rosenberg, representing international historical sociology, in particular em-
phasizes that, since its infancy, IR has not found its own subject matter or voice, but 
it has emerged accepting the fact that it is a simple extension of another discipline, 
namely Political Science. IR exists, acknowledging the fact that the essence of interna-
tional politics consists of the same assumptions that have been accepted as politics per 
se since Aristotle. If IR is only a sub-discipline of Political Science, the only identity it 
can assume is negative: it can study politics in the same way political science does in 
the absence of central authority (Rosenberg, 2016b: 7). In addition, the thesis that there 
is no central authority in international relations raises numerous empirical doubts.
In an article published in 1965, the sociologist Gianfranco Poggi observed that 
modern sociology had focused mainly on studying the internal structure and dynamics 
of social units. This resulted in the theoretical inability to include in its field of interests 
a separate causal dynamics and behavior patterns arising from the interactive coexist-
ence of many societies and countries (Poggi, 1965: 284). Although classical sociology 
does not treat interactions between societies as completely irrelevant, they are usually 
overlooked as causative factors in explaining ‘the inner history of societies.’ From 
Karl Marx, through Ferdinand Tönnies, to Émile Durkheim and Talcott Parsons it was 
thought that societies are ‘natural systems’ which change because of their internal 
conditions. This lack in the intellectual tradition of international theory seemed to du-
plicate the tradition of classical political philosophy, which was iconically expressed 
by Martin Wight’s question of why there is no international theory.
The problem of how to theorize international relations has been disregarded in 
the sociological tradition, inspiring many contemporary historical sociologists and IR 
researchers to abandon the unitary understanding of society. In the theories of long-
term social change, the concepts of ‘networks’ and ‘flows’ have emerged, that operate 
through and cannot be reduced to individual societies. Social development has been in-
creasingly contextualized in the wider framework of ‘inter-social systems.’ However, 
when we try to pinpoint concrete progress in a macro-historical analysis by assigning 
more vital agency to inter-social relations, we usually encounter two approaches to 
the sense of internationality: the ‘extra-social’ one, which we have called externalist, 
and a ‘reductionist’ one, which we have named internalist. As a consequence, both IR 
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and historical sociology have oscillated between the reification of ‘internationality’ by 
political realists as a supra-historical and supra-social sphere and the reductionist con-
ceptualizations of ‘internationality’ as a separate causal property of the social world 
in the form of a ‘domestic analogy’. Hedley Bull (1966) showed how to transform 
‘internationality’ into ‘domestic analogy’. As a result, this methodological dichotomy 
and the problems it generated constituted the core of debates in IR (Anievas, Matin, 
2016: 4).
In addition to ‘grand theories’ and ‘middle-range’ theories, we need a theory that 
defines the ‘hard core’ of the discipline. If we look at the ‘big debates’ in IR, none of 
them has addressed the problem of the ontology of internationality. They have been 
dominated, first and foremost, by epistemological issues regarding the methods of gen-
erating valid knowledge in IR. It is difficult to indicate a debate focusing on seeking 
the answer to the question of what internationality is.
Let us ask the fundamental question of what feature of the social world can con-
stitute the deepest ontological assumption of IR. The answer is simple and inevitable. 
The word internationality always leads to the same fundamental circumstance: human 
existence has never been individual, but always multiple. The multiplicity of interna-
tionality has always boiled down to interacting societies. This is an elementary fact of 
the human world that justifies the existence of IR as an academic discipline. No other 
discipline places in its ontological center the fact of social multiplicity (Rosenberg, 
2016b: 9). Units of this social multiplicity have assumed various forms (of families, 
clans, tribes, city-states, empires, or states) creating a socially and politically frag-
mented character of the history itself. Moreover, in international relations, the mul-
tiplicity of political units has a decisive influence on the nature of policy itself. It is 
not limited to politics and power relations, but extends to encompass social, economic 
and cultural spheres. Ultimately, it is social multiplicity rather than politics that con-
stitutes the deepest code of internationality as a feature of human existence. And this 
multiplicity demands its own voice, a voice that tells us that social existence has been 
multiple and interactive since time immemorial (Rosenberg, 2016b: 10, 20).
Rosenberg realizes that all social sciences and humanities face the outcomes of so-
cial multiplicity (internationality), just as IR must consider issues related to spatiality 
and temporality when dealing with its subject of research. However, IR’s ‘grand idea’ 
defined in this way has important implications for all social sciences. Some of these 
consequences are partly known to us, although usually in the negative form established 
in political science, such as the lack of an authority over states. Only to a small ex-
tent, however, have we identified the positive consequences of internationality, which 
Rosenberg terms as copresence of many interacting societies. According to Rosenberg, 
the most important consequences of internationality include co-existence, difference, 
interaction, combination, and dialectical change.
Coexistence creates a new level of social reality, an additional type of social phe-
nomenon outside the internal structures of every society. At this level, not only politics 
acquires special features, becoming geopolitics, but a boat transforms into a ship, mon-
ey into currency, conflict into war, economics into international economics, sociology 
into international historical sociology, etc. Coexistence also creates additional social 
causality and ethics. Social multiplicity generates internationality itself as a separate 
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dimension of the social world. IR has a special mandate to make this dimension its core 
and to adopt it as the object of its research. We know from history that human societies 
have always been multiple, and this multiplicity defines the social world to the same 
extent as the centralized power existing in them does. Additionally, the lack of central 
authority in international relations, by definition cannot cause anything, because such 
authority simply does not exist. As we refer to internationality, we need a language 
that will allow us to properly examine what does exist, and this is a language of mul-
tiplicity. One of the legitimate definitions of internationality may therefore be as fol-
lows: internationality is the coexistence of more than one society.
Difference is a necessary consequence of multiplicity. The reason for this differ-
ence partly is that individual communities occupy different ecological niches, but also 
the uniqueness of their relations with others. Another reason for this difference is also 
the distribution of social development that takes different forms in different places at 
the same time. Internationality therefore embeds difference and multi-linearity in the 
nature of global social development.
Interaction, alongside coexistence and difference, is also a result of multiplicity, 
that is a source of both benefits and threats. On the one hand, the development poten-
tial of many societies has been interrupted and destroyed by external pressures, on the 
other hand there have been many cases of development accomplished through interac-
tions with other societies. All societies have experienced such processes. Interactions 
form the basic dimension of social action in international relations: cooperation, con-
flicts, diplomacy, organizations, law, exchanges, etc.
Combination as a consequence of internationality means that all societies must 
be a result of constant combinations of locally established development patterns with 
external influences and pressures. The internal structure of society is conditioned, de-
termined, and sometimes created or destroyed by external factors everywhere. Each 
society is connected with other societies, interdependent and often formed by sociali-
zation processes that intersect them. Through combination, multiplicity is reflected in 
the internal constitution of the societies themselves.
Dialectical change is the concept used by Rosenberg to capture the process of glo-
bal development. This process must be dialectical in the sense that exchanges between 
social formations open up new possibilities through mechanisms that are inseparable 
from the phenomenon of interaction itself. In 1620, Francis Bacon pointed out that the 
modern world was distinguished from the past by three key inventions: firearms, the 
printing press and magnetic compass. Even though these inventions had originated in 
China and came to Europe through trade and communication, in a new environment 
they developed and exerted an influence which they had never achieved in China. Such 
transfers from one society to another generate new and different development proc-
esses affecting the process of global development itself. Seen in a broader perspective, 
the birth of the West was also rooted in the dialectical causality generated by the inter-
actions of many societies (Rosenberg, 2016b: 10–13).
Rosenberg asks what these consequences of multiplicity say about the subject mat-
ter of IR? Firstly, they tell us all that internationality is more than a sub-discipline of 
Political Science. In addition to attempting to understand international politics, IR is 
also trying to understand the importance of social multiplicity for the entire social 
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world, its social structures, economic systems, cultural processes, etc. This means that, 
as researchers of international relations, we have something important to tell other dis-
ciplines about their subject matters. What is the most important thing that we want to 
tell them, then? Simply put, we want to tell them that in their theorizations of politics, 
economics, culture, society, human, etc., they should note that each of these activities 
takes place in a wider context of multiple societies (Rosenberg, 2016b: 14).
Discussing IR, Barry Buzan and George Lawson take a ‘configuration’ approach 
to ‘global transformation’ emphasizing the contingent relationship between historical 
events and social processes. The basic assumption of this approach is that big events 
do not require big causes. Rather, social transformations arise from the conjunctural 
intersection of sequences of events and processes that are causally, but contingently, in-
terrelated (Buzan, Lawson, 2015: 1). The contingency of this relationship weakens the 
role of theories, which usually exaggeratedly indicate the relationship of contingently 
interacting causes; reasons that are of course external to any theoretical scheme.
The source of the great achievements in many contemporary historical-sociological 
works on the emergence of the modern world (Anderson, 1974; Wallerstein, 1974–2011; 
Mann, 1986, 1993; Wood, 2002) is obviously seen in their structural approach. Even 
in the neo-Weberian discourse, the recognition of multiple reasons is not tantamount 
to rejecting the structural way of explaining, and concepts such as ‘co-determination,’ 
‘mutual interdependence,’ ‘path dependency’ or ‘intertwined development’ are not 
identified with contingency. Even though contingency is given a role, the dominant 
model of understanding causality in the neo-Weberian perspective is structural (Ani-
evas, 2016: 475).
However, the contingent nature of the social world can be a theoretical assumption. 
Pointing to the absolute contingency of social processes can be a theoretical argument 
against the structural approach in IR. Contingency can be internalized in theory as an 
object of theorizing.
According to the theory of uneven and connected development, inequality leads 
to developmental diversity both within and between societies. The basic fact of the 
ontology of human development is the multiplicity of societies which differ in size, 
culture, political organization and economic system. This can be regarded as a trans-
historic feature of the historical process (Rosenberg, 2006). Taking this perspective 
makes it possible to explain both the quantitative (multiplicity of societies) and quali-
tative (different societies) aspects of development (Rosenberg, 2013: 576). The theory, 
however, not only describes the two static conditions of development (multiplicity 
and difference), but explains how their dialectical interactions create a socio-relational 
texture of the historical process in which the changing identity of individual societies 
emerges and crystallizes (Rosenberg, 2006: 324). Pointing to the specific features of 
the development of every society as a necessary (though highly variable) result of this 
inter-social environment, historical development itself cannot be reduced to a linear 
path (Anievas, 2016: 477). Thus, although a particular pattern of socio-cultural diver-
sity at any given time is contingent, the fact of this diversity in itself is not (Rosenberg, 
2006: 317).
When different social formations interact, it is impossible to predict the result of 
these interactions which makes them ‘contingent.’ This indeterminacy of the results of 
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interaction can be defined as an inherent property of development itself. As a result, 
the theory of uneven and connected development explains various forms of agency and 
the results of ‘necessary but contingent’ interactions, while avoiding the deterministic 
and linear understanding of causality and development (Anievas, 2016: 477). Rosen-
berg invokes contemporary examples of such uneven and connected development. In 
Saudi Arabia, a tribal political system has been grafted onto an industrializing society. 
The state, which owns the wealth of society, is itself owned by about 7,000 members 
of princely families. Nevertheless, a significant part of global energy supplies rests 
on this peculiar political hybrid. In China, the communist government is directing the 
process of capitalist industrialization on an unprecedented scale, creating the second 
economy in the world. In Iran, theocratic power is locked in a confrontation with the 
great powers over its use of nuclear technology (Rosenberg, 2016a: 27). The specifi-
city of these examples shows the impossibility of their internalist, externalist or cor-
relationist explanation.
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ABSTRACT
Why is there no philosophy of International Relations? Why, despite the significant intellectual 
and institutional development of International Relations after World War II, has IR failed to 
generate any ‘grand ideas’ that would influence the broadly understood humanities?
None of the theories of international relations indicates the exceptional features of interna-
tionality as its foundation. None of these theories formulates a fundamental claim to its subject 
matter in International Relations the way geography, history or sociology do. This leads to the 
conviction that international relations do not have to be formed by aspects of the social world 
that are specific to them, and can be interpreted in terms of ideas imported from the disciplines 
that deal with examining aspects relevant to them. The basic disadvantage of this openness of 
International Relations to other disciplines is the lack of reflection on its own ‘deep ontology.’ 
This seems to be the most important reason for the lack of a philosophy of International Rela-
tions.
The author accomplishes two basic goals in his text. Firstly, he undermines the legitimacy 
of the three attitudes prevailing in IR on understanding internationality, which he calls internal-
ism, externalism and correlationism. Secondly, he presents the essence and consequences of 
the negative character of IR, which involves the absence of the philosophy of IR and studying 
internationality in the same manner as political science does.
The author argues that understanding this ‘strange orthodoxy’ can be a means to overcom-
ing it, thereby opening up the possibility of conceiving the ontology of IR, or outlining the path 
leading to the philosophy of International Relations. Finally, the author refers to the proposal of 
Justin Rosenberg, to then present an idea for an ontology on which the philosophy of Interna-
tional Relations could be founded.
 
Keywords: philosophy of International Relations, internalism, externalism, correlationism, on-
tology, multiplicity
DLACZEGO NIE MA FILOZOFII NAUKI  
O STOSUNKACH MIĘDZYNARODOWYCH? 
 
STRESZCZENIE
Dlaczego nie ma filozofii nauki o stosunkach międzynarodowych? Dlaczego pomimo istotnego 
intelektualnego i instytucjonalnego rozwoju nauki o stosunkach międzynarodowych po II woj-
nie światowej, nie wygenerowała ona żadnych „wielkich idei”, które wywarłyby wpływ na 
szeroko rozumiane nauki humanistyczne?
Żadna z teorii stosunków międzynarodowych nie wskazuje jako swojego fundamentu wy-
jątkowych własności międzynarodowości. Żadna z tych teorii nie formułuje fundacyjnego rosz-
czenia do własnego przedmiotu w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych na sposób w jaki 
robią to geografia, historia czy socjologia. Prowadzi to do przekonania, że stosunki międzyna-
rodowe nie muszą być kształtowane przez swoiste dla nich aspekty świata społecznego i można 
je interpretować za pomocą idei importowanych z dyscyplin, które zajmują się badaniem wła-
ściwych dla nich aspektów. Podstawową wadą tej otwartości nauki o stosunkach międzynaro-
dowych na inne dyscypliny jest brak namysłu nad własną „głęboką ontologią”. W tym wydaje 
się tkwić najważniejsza przyczyna braku filozofii nauki o stosunkach międzynarodowych.
Autor realizuje w swoim tekście dwa podstawowe cele. Po pierwsze, podważa zasadność 
dominujących w NSM stanowisk w kwestii rozumienia międzynarodowości, które nazywa in-
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ternalizmem, eksternalizmem i korelacjonizmem. Po drugie, przedstawia istotę i konsekwencje 
negatywnego charakteru NSM polegającego na braku filozofii dyscypliny i badaniu międzyna-
rodowości na wzór nauk politycznych.
Autor przekonuje, że zrozumienie tej „dziwnej ortodoksji” może otworzyć drogę do jej 
przezwyciężenia. Jej pokonanie zaś otworzyć możliwość pomyślenia ontologii NSM, czyli za-
rysować drogę prowadzącą do filozofii nauki o stosunkach międzynarodowych. Ostatecznie, 
odwołując się do propozycji J. Rosenberga, przedstawia ideę ontologii, na której można budo-
wać filozofię nauki o stosunkach międzynarodowych.
 
Słowa kluczowe: filozofia nauki o stosunkach międzynarodowych, internalizm, eksternalizm, 
korelacjonizm, wielość

